为探究公路零碳货运走廊成功实践背后的机制及不同主体的参与演化路径，本文建立了公路运营商-充换电站-货运车队三方主体演化博弈模型，引入政府补贴并考察其对策略稳定性的影响。基于Lyapunov稳定性理论推导系统演化稳定策略的实现条件，并开展数值仿真实验。结果表明，政府高强度补贴、提高各主体初始参与意愿均能有效推动系统向理想稳定状态演化。敏感性分析显示：零碳改造成本对运营商策略收敛方向与速度有显著影响；通行费用上升将削弱走廊对车队的吸引力，但对电站的影响相对有限。与之对应，电站运营成本变动对电站和车队的策略演进均有显著影响，而对运营商的直接作用较弱；车队的非经济效益（如充电效率）提升有助于其向理想状态演进，且低利润车队对非运单收益增长的响应更为积极。在补能供需不匹配情况下，车队最大损失对系统稳定性的冲击显著大于充换电站的对应损失。这一研究发现有助于厘清零碳货运走廊项目不同主体博弈与策略依存关系，为货运低碳转型提供理论借鉴和政策参考。

To explore the mechanisms underpinning the successful practice of zero-carbon freight corridors on highway systems and the evolutionary pathways of heterogeneous stakeholders participating, a tripartite evolutionary game model involving highway operators, charging and battery-swapping stations, and freight fleets is constructed. It introduces government subsidies and examines the effects on the stability of evolutionary strategies. Based on Lyapunov stability theory, the conditions for the realisation of evolutionarily stable strategies are derived, and numerical simulation experiments are conducted. The results indicate that high-intensity government subsidies and enhancing stakeholders′ initial strategic willingness will promote the system to an ideal stable state. Sensitivity analysis of the ideal stable state reveals that operators′ zero-carbon retrofit costs significantly influence the direction and speed of their own strategy convergence; rising toll fees weaken corridors′ attractiveness and thereby affect fleet behaviour, whereas the impact on stations remains comparatively limited. Conversely, changes in station operating costs have a significant impact on the strategic evolution of stations and freight fleets, but exert a relatively limited direct effect on highway operators. Improvements in fleets′ non-economic benefits, such as charging efficiency, help to promote their evolution towards the ideal state. Moreover, low-profit fleets respond more positively to increases in non-waybill benefits brought by zero-carbon freight corridors. Under charging supply-demand mismatch situation, the maximum loss borne by fleets is markedly more detrimental to system stability than the corresponding loss of stations, while operators′ strategy evolution rates exhibit relatively low sensitivity to mismatch parameters. These findings clarify the strategic interactions and interdependencies among stakeholders in zero-carbon freight corridor projects and provide theoretical insights and policy references for promoting the low-carbon transition of freight transport.