摘要
鉴于国内传统城市公共自行车与共享单车在功能和服务对象等方面表现出的明显互补性,为促成合作从而实现联盟超可加性,研究城市公租单车系统中多方合作的收益分配具有必要性。首先,针对城市公租单车系统中各参与主体的利益分配问题,以合作博弈为基础,构建了共享单车、城市公共自行车、政府的三方合作博弈模型。然后,利用Shapley值法对合作博弈模型进行求解,得出收益分配向量。接着,以一致许可值法为基础,考虑参与人在进出联盟时对其他参与人的外部性影响,改进收益分配向量,使得联盟收益分配更合理,联盟更稳定。最后,以兰州市为例的收益分配计算结果表明,城市公租单车系统中各参与人的合作收益符合集体理性;分配结果符合个体理性;政府应处于主导地位,以监管和补贴为主要手段主动促成大联盟的形成。
Abstract
Domestic traditional urban public bicycles and shared bicycles show obvious complementarity in terms of functions and service objects. In order to promote the cooperation and realize the super-additivity of the alliance, it is necessary to study the distribution of multi-party cooperation payoffs in public bicycle system. Firstly, based on the cooperative game, a three-party cooperative game model of shared bicycle, urban public bicycle and government for the payoffs distribution was constructed. Secondly, the cooperative game model was solved by using the Shapley value method to obtain the payoffs distribution vector. Then considering the external characteristics of the parties when entering and leaving the coalition, the payoffs distribution vector was improved based on the consensus value method, so that the payoffs distribution is more reasonable and the coalition is more stable. Finally, taking Lanzhou as an example, the results of its payoffs distribution calculation show that the cooperative payoffs of each party in the public bicycle system conforms the group rationality; the distribution result conforms the individual rationality; the government should be in a dominant position, with supervision and subsidies as the main means to actively promote the formation of the major coalition.
关键词
共享单车 /
博弈论 /
合作博弈 /
Shapley值 /
一致许可值
Key words
shared bicycle /
game theory /
cooperative game theory /
Shapley value /
consensus value
安鑫山,许佳莹.
共享单车参与的城市公租单车合作博弈[J]. 交通运输研究. 2020, 6(2): 60-67
An Xin-shan, Xu Jia-ying.
Cooperative Game of Public Rental Bicycle under the Influence of Bicycle-Sharing[J]. Transport Research. 2020, 6(2): 60-67
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