In order to optimize the prevention-driven security investment strategies of the local government and the hazardous materials(Hazmat) transportation enterprise, reduce the probability of transportation accidents and decrease the damage caused by accidents, a prevention-based security investment model incorporating perceived and actual probabilities of accident occurrence, the damage caused by accidents, the return and spillover effect of investment between the local government and the Hazmat transportation enterprise was developed by considering the uncertainty and destructiveness of Hazmat transportation accident. Moreover, the investment decision cases without and with coordination between the local government and the Hazmat transportation enterprise were analyzed, then the optimal investment level and the perceived and actual expected investment cost under each case were proposed. Finally, the investment levels and actual expected investment cost under the two cases were compared. It is shown that the optimal security investment amount of the local government or the Hazmat transportation enterprise is positively correlated with their own loss of the confronting accidents and negatively correlated with that of the other side. The relationship between the optimal security investment level of the local government (or the Hazmat transportation enterprise), the investment income coefficient and the investment benefit spillover factor mainly depend on the relative losses of dangerous transportation accidents they face. Only considering the optimal security investment level, the local government and the Hazmat transportation enterprise have no motivation to collaborate in security investment decision.
王伟，蔡娜，丁黎黎，张文思
. Prevention-Driven Security Investment Strategies of Local Government and Hazardous Materials Transportation Enterprise[J]. Transport Research, 2020
, 6(5)
: 92
-100
.
DOI: 10.16503/j.cnki.2095-9931.2020.05.012
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